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Abstract
Judea Pearl’s insight that, when errors are assumed independent, the Pure (aka
Natural) Direct Effect (PDE) is non-parametrically identified via the Mediation
Formula was ‘path-breaking’ in more than one sense! In the same paper Pearl
described a thought-experiment as a way to motivate the PDE. Analysis of this
experiment led Robins & Richardson to a novel way of conceptualizing direct ef-
fects in terms of interventions on an expanded graph in which treatment is decom-
posed into multiple separable components. We further develop this novel theory
here, showing that it provides a self-contained framework for discussing media-
tion without reference to cross-world (nested) counterfactuals or interventions on
the mediator. The theory preserves the dictum ‘no causation without manipula-
tion’ and makes questions of mediation empirically testable in future Randomized
Controlled Trials. Even so, we prove the interventionist and nested counterfactual
approaches remain tightly coupled under a Non-Parametric Structural Equation
Model except in the presence of a ‘recanting witness.’ In fact, our analysis also
leads to a simple sound and complete algorithm for determining identification in
the (non-interventionist) theory of path-specific counterfactuals.
1 Introduction
In the companion paper [20] we describe graphical counterfactual models correspond-
ing to the FFRCISTG models of [13]. Such models correspond to conditional indepen-
dencies encoded by the d-separation criterion in Single World Intervention Graphs. We
gave a general identification theory for treatment effects in such models with hidden
variables that is a generalization of the theory [26] and [19]. We also described the
differences between the FFRCISTG/SWIG model and the Non-Parametric Structural
Equation Model with Independent Errors (NPSEM-IE).
∗ An earlier version of this article is to appear in Probabilistic and Causal Inference: The Works of Judea
Pearl, Hector Geffner, Rina Dechter, and Joseph Y. Halpern, ACM Books, 2020 (Forthcoming)
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Figure 1: (a) A DAG G representing the underlying structure in the combined obser-
vational and randomized trial of treatments for River Blindness; see page 5. Here A
indicates a randomized trial (a = 1) or an observational study (a = 0); M is whether
the patient received Ivermectin; Y is the patient’s vision; S indicates access to a clinic;
R is treatment with immuno suppressants; U indicates the inclination of the patient to
avail themselves of medical care that is offered. (b) The SWIG G(a,m) resulting from
G; (c) and (d) show SWIGs G(a = 0,m) and G(a = 1,m) that incorporate additional
context specific causal information. (a∗), (b∗), (c∗), (d∗) show the corresponding latent
projections.
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Given that a treatment effect of A on Y is established, it is often desirable to try to
understand the contribution to the total effect of A on Y of the other variablesM that
lie on causal pathways from A to Y . Variables lying on the causal pathways are called
mediators of the effect of A on Y . This leads to consideration of direct and indirect
effects. Several different types of direct effect have been considered previously. Most
have asked whether “the outcome (Y ) would have been different had cause (A) been
different, but the level of the mediator (M ) remained unchanged.” Differences arise
regarding what it means to say thatM remains unchanged.
In Section 2 chapter we will first review these notions, the assumptions under which
they are identified and the extent to which identification claims can be verified (in prin-
ciple) via an experiment. These considerations will lead to a novel way of conceptual-
izing direct effects introduced in [15] and generalized in Section 3 herein. This novel
interventionist approach does not require counterfactuals defined in terms of the me-
diator. We first describe our interventionist approach to causal mediation analysis in
the context of direct and indirect effects. This approach (i) need not assume that the
mediatorM has well defined causal effects and/or counterfactuals, but (ii) instead hy-
pothesizes that treatment variable A can be decomposed into multiple separable com-
ponents each contributing to the overall effect of treatment, (iii) preserves the dictum
“no causation without manipulation,” (iv) makes questions of mediation empirically
testable in future RCTs, (v) may facilitate communication with subject matter experts,
and (vi) when identified from data, the identifying formulae under an interventionist
approach and those obtained from the other (mediator-based) approach are identical;
however the causal effects being identified differ since they refer to intervening on dif-
ferent variables. This theory has been extended and applied by others in the context
of mediation in survival analysis [4, 1] and recently to competing risks [25, 24] and
interference problems [23].
Finally in section 4 we extend this approach to arbitrary (identified) path-specific
specific effects. This allows the (generalized) ID algorithm described in [20] plus one
extra step to be used as a sound and complete algorithm for determining the identifica-
tion of path-specific distributions; we also provide a version for handling conditional
queries. Finally, we describe the differences between the nested counterfactual ap-
proach and the interventionist approach under non-identification.
2 Approaches to mediation based on counterfactuals
defined in terms of the mediator: theCDE and PDE
One approach to having M remain unchanged would be for M to be fixed via an
intervention. On this view bothA andM are treatments, and we consider the difference
between an intervention setting A to a andM tom, versus an intervention setting A to
a′ andM tom. This leads to the definition of a controlled direct effect (CDE):
CDEa,a′(m) ≡ E[Y (a
′,m)− Y (a,m)]. (1)
If the value of Y is affected by setting A to a versus a′, when M is held fixed at a
given value (m), (1) will be non-zero. Given a causal graph G, a straightforward ap-
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plication of graphical causal identification theory1 determines whether the distribution
P (Y (a,m)), and thus whether the CDEa,a′(m) contrast, is identified.
There are situations in which other notions of direct effect are more natural. In
particular, there are contexts in which we wish to know whether A taking the value
of a′ (rather than the baseline level a) would lead to a change in the value of Y if the
effect of A on M were ‘blocked’. Specifically, if the effect on M of A taking a′ was
blocked so that the mediator M takes the the value M(a) that M would take were A
set to the baseline value a.
Along these lines, in many contexts we may ask what ‘fraction’ of the (total) effect
of A on Y may be attributed to a particular causal pathway. For example, consider
a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) that investigates the effect of an anti-smoking
intervention (A) on the outcome myocardial infarction (MI) at 2 years (Y ) among non-
hypertensive smokers. For simplicity, assume everyone in the treatment arm and no
one in the placebo arm quit cigarettes, that all subjects were tested for new-onset hy-
pertension (M ) at the end of the first year, and no subject suffered an MI in the first
year. Hence A, M , and Y occur in that order. Suppose the trial showed smoking ces-
sation had a beneficial effect on both hypertension and MI. It is natural to ask: “What
fraction of the total effect of smoking cessation (A) on MI (Y ) is via a pathway that
does not involve hypertension (M )?”
These ideas lead to the pure direct effect2 defined in [14], which in counterfactual
notation can be written as follows:
PDEa,a′ ≡ E[Y (a
′,M(a))− Y (a,M(a))] = E[Y (a′,M(a))− Y (a)]. (2)
This is the difference between two quantities: first, the outcome Y that would result
if we set A to a′, while ‘holding fixed’M at the valueM(a) that it would have taken
hadA been a; second, the outcome Y that would result from simply settingA to a (and
thus havingM again take the valueM(a)). In [14], the first was alternately described
as the result of setting A to a′ on Y when the the effect of A onM is blocked, thereby
leaving M unchanged from its reference value M(a). Thus the Pure Direct Effect
interprets had “M remained unchanged” to mean “had (somehow)M taken the value
that it would have taken had we fixed A to a.”
As another application of this idea, [7] p.131 cites the following legal opinion aris-
ing in a discrimination case: “The central question in any employment discrimination
case is whether the employer would have taken the same action had the employee been
of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin etc.) and everything else had been
the same.” (Carson vs. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 70 FEP Cases 921, 7th Cir. (1996)).
Here A corresponds to membership in a protected class, while M corresponds to
criteria, such as qualifications, that are permitted to be considered in such decisions. If
the PDE is non-zero then discrimination has taken place.
A notion of the indirect effect may be defined similarly, using the nested counter-
factual Y (a′,M(a)). On the additive scale, direct and indirect effects may be used to
1See the companion paper [20] and references therein.
2Also called the natural direct effect in [6].
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give a decomposition of the average causal effect [14]:
E[Y (a′)]− E[Y (a)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
average causal effect
= (E[Y (a′)]− E[Y (a′,M(a))])︸ ︷︷ ︸
total indirect effect
+(E[Y (a′,M(a))]− E[Y (a)])︸ ︷︷ ︸
pure direct effect
= (E[Y (a′)]− E[Y (a,M(a′))])︸ ︷︷ ︸
total direct effect
+(E[Y (a,M(a′))]− E[Y (a)])︸ ︷︷ ︸
pure indirect effect
.
(3)
Notice that the PDE depends on Y (a′,M(a)) — a variable in which two differ-
ent levels of a are nested within the counterfactual for Y . Consequently, in contrast
to CDEa,a′ this counterfactual does not correspond to any experimental intervention
on A and M . This is because in order to know the value M(a) for a unit, it is nec-
essary to set A to a, but this then precludes setting A to a′. This is a manifestation
of the fundamental problem of causal inference: it is not possible for a single unit to
receive two different levels of the same treatment at the same time. For this reason the
counterfactual Y (a′,M(a)) is referred to as a cross-world counterfactual.3
The differences in the assumptions made by the FFRCISTG and NPSEM-IE mod-
els lead to quite different identification results for the PDE in the context of the simple
DAG shown in Figure 3 (a). These differences reflect important epistemological dis-
tinctions between the two frameworks, that are described in §2.3 and §2.4 below.
2.1 Two Hypothetical River Blindness Treatment Studies
Wewill use as a running example the following pair of hypothetical studies that are rep-
resented together in the single causal graph shown in Figure 1(a), as described below:
A random sample of individuals in an impoverished medically underserved catchment
area are selected to participate in a double-blind placebo controlled randomized trial
(A = 1 selected, A = 0 otherwise) of single dose therapy with the drug Ivermectin
(M = 1 received the drug, M = 0 otherwise) for the treatment of onchocerciasis
(river blindness). The outcome is diminished vision 9 months later (Y = 1 if worse
than 20/100 and Y = 0 otherwise). All subjects in the trial complied with their as-
signed therapy. The trial was motivated in part by the fact that Ivermectin was already
being sold by local shop owners as a cure for river blindness without evidence for effec-
tiveness or safety in the local population. After the trial finished, an NGO carried out
a retrospective observational cohort study on a random subset of non-selected subjects
(A = 0), collecting data onM and Y .
In a subset of patients Ivermectin can actually decrease visual acuity. This oc-
curs when the larvae in the eye killed by Ivermectin induce an over vigorous immune
response. Because of this side effect, a clinic available to all trial participants was es-
tablished to screen for the above side-effect and treat with immune suppressive drugs
if required (R = 1 if treated with immune suppressants, R = 0 otherwise) to prevent
further eye damage. The patients not selected for the study had neither access to the
clinic nor to immune therapy. Thus letting S = 1 (S = 0) denote access (no access)
3 Formally, we will say that a counterfactual expression is cross-world if it involves assigning more than
one value to a single index.
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to a clinic, we have S = 1 iff A = 1 and R = 0 if A = 0. Finally we let U denote
an unmeasured variable with U = 1 and U = 0 denoting individuals with greater ver-
sus lesser propensity to take medical treatments if offered. In the unselected subjects
(A = 0), U is thus positively correlated withM . In contrast, owing to random assign-
ment ofM , U andM are independent in selected subjects (A = 1). On the other hand,
in selected subjects, conditional onM , U is positively correlated with R and thus with
Y ; in unselected subjects U and Y are independent given M because treatment with
R is not available. (Here we assume U has an effect on Y only through the treatments
actually received.) Finally, records recording which of the selected subjects received
immuno-suppressive therapy in the trial were destroyed in a fire so the data available
for analysis were solely (A,M, Y ), the same variables available in the observational
study.
2.2 The PDE & CDE in the River Blindness studies
We next explain the meaning of the CDE and PDE in the context of the Ivermectin
studies. There we suppose the true data-generating process is as described by the DAG
in Figure 1(a). Recall that the corresponding latent projection4 is given in Figure 1(a∗)
because in Figure 1(a) there is a causal path from A to Y , and U is a common cause of
M and Y . In this contextM(a = 0) is the Ivermectin treatment that the patient would
select in the observational study where A is 0. Likewise Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) is
the patient’s outcome if they received the Ivermectin treatment as in the observational
study (where A is 0) but, as in the randomized study (where A is 1), a clinic (S = 1)
was made available to them.5 To see why, note that Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) corresponds
to the effect of setting a = 1 on Y through all causal pathways (S → R → Y ) not
passing through Ivermectin (M ) whenM remains at its self selected valueM(a = 0)
in the observational study. Finally Y (a = 0) ≡ Y (a = 0,M(a = 0)) is the patient’s
outcome if they were assigned to the observational study and did not have access to
the clinic. The PDE is the mean of the difference Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) − Y (a =
0,M(a = 0)).
The CDE(m = 0) is the mean effect on Y of having (s = 1) versus not hav-
ing (s = 0) a clinic available had no one received Ivermectin (m = 0).6 Likewise,
CDE(m = 1) is the clinic effect when all subjects received Ivermectin (m = 1). In
contrast, as noted above, the PDE is the mean effect of having versus not having a
clinic available had subjects chosen Ivermectin treatment (M ) as in the observational
study.
Identification of the CDE in the River Blindness studies
We next consider whether the CDE(m = 0) and CDE(m = 1) are identified from
the available data on A, M and Y . From examining the latent projection shown in
4 See §4.1 in the companion paper [20] for this definition and other standard graphical definitions.
5If patients know that a clinic is available then this may influence their decision to take Ivermectin; thus
in order for the patient’s decision to be as in the observational study, they would need to make decisions
relating to Ivermectin treatment before being told that a clinic is available.
6This is because Y (a,m) = Y (S(a), m) = Y (s,m) since S(a) = a.
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Figure 1(a∗), one would expect that the CDE is not identified owing to the bidirected
edgeM ↔ Y . In particular, identification does not follow from existing methods such
as the do-calculus, the ID algorithm7 or the back-door criterion [7], though see [27].
However, we will now show, perhaps surprisingly, that we do have identification
of the CDE. This is a consequence of context specific independencies. Although
such independencies cannot be represented using standard causal DAGs (or their latent
projections) an extension to context specific SWIGs due to [3] and [16] makes this
possible.
Consider the SWIG G(a,m) resulting from a joint intervention setting A to a and
M to m as shown in Figure 1(b) and its latent projection shown in Figure 1(b∗). This
SWIG G(a,m) shown in Figure 1(b), represents the conditional independence rela-
tions that hold for all four of the possible counterfactual distributions (a,m ∈ {0, 1})
resulting from jointly intervening on A andM .
Consider the two interventions setting a = 1. These interventions correspond
to performing the randomized trial in which treatment M is randomly assigned and
thus U ⊥⊥M(a = 1). Consequently, the distribution of the counterfactuals may be
represented by the SWIG G(a = 1,m), shown in Figure 1(d), in which the edge
U →M(a = 1) is absent.
Now consider the remaining two interventions setting a = 0, i.e. assigned to the
observational study. Recall that the clinic (S) and (hence) treatment with immuno
suppressants (R) are only available to those people who were selected for the trial
(a = 1). Thus for all subjects in the observational study (a = 0), S(0) = R(0,m) =
0. Consequently, U ⊥⊥R(a = 0,m) | A,M(a=0), since the inclination (U ) of the
patient does not affect whether they have access to immuno suppressants. Hence the
distribution of the counterfactuals may be represented by the SWIG G(a = 0,m),
shown in Figure 1(c), in which the edge U → R(a = 0,m) is absent.8
Applying d-separation to the latent projections in Figure 1(c∗) and (d∗) we see that9
Y (a,m)⊥⊥M(a), A for a = 0, 1. (4)
Consequently, since Y = Y (a,M(a) = m) on the event A = a,M(a) = m,
p(Y |A = a,M = m) = p(Y (a,m)), (5)
is identified for both a = 0 and a = 1. Hence the CDE(m) of A and M on Y is
identified.
As noted above, the identification (5) does not follow from the DAG in Figure 1(a),
with the latent projection in Figure 1(a∗). However, the independences U⊥⊥R(a =
0,m) | A,M(a = 0) and U⊥⊥M(a = 1) | A can be encoded by and read from the
context specific SWIGs shown in Figure 1(c) and (d), respectively.10
7Note that the ID algorithm is complete [19] with respect to models defined in terms of the independences
holding in a (standard) causal DAG; these independences are not context-specific.
8Since S(0) and R(0, m) are constants we could also leave out the edges S(0) → R(0, m) and m →
R(0, m) on the same basis, but this would not change our conclusions.
9Recall that when testing d-separation in SWIGs, fixed nodes such as a = 0 in Figure 1(c∗) and a = 1
in Figure 1(d∗) are always blocked.
10These independences cannot be read from the SWIG G(a,m) shown in Figure 1(b) that was constructed
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Together with consistency, these independences imply, respectively,U⊥⊥R | A = 0
and U⊥⊥M | A = 1. Since, in addition to (4), we also have M(a)⊥⊥A for a = 0, 1,
it follows that the distribution of the counterfactuals {A,M(a), Y (a,m) for all a,m}
obeys the FFRCISTG model associated with the graph shown in Figure 3 (a) in which
there are no bi-directed edges. Interestingly, we show below in §2.5 that M(a= 0) 6
⊥⊥Y (a=1,m).11 Consequently, the distribution of the counterfactuals does not obey
the NPSEM-IE associated with Figure 3(a), and thus the PDE is not identified without
additional assumptions beyond those of the NPSEM-IE model.
2.3 Identification of the PDE via the Mediation Formula under
the NPSEM-IE for Figure 3(a)
We now consider the situation in which, unlike the Ivermectin example above, the
NPSEM-IE associated with the graph in Figure 3 (a) holds. In this case the PDEa,a′
is identified via the following “Mediation Formula” [6, 8]:
meda,a′ ≡
∑
m
(E[Y |m, a]− E[Y |m, a′]) p(m | a′) (6)
=
(∑
m
E[Y |m, a]p(m | a′)
)
− E[Y | a′] (7)
The proof of this result, under the NPSEM-IE is as follows:
p(Y (a,M(a′) = m) = y)
=
∑
m
p(Y (a,M(a′) = m) = y |M(a′) = m)p(M(a′) = m)
=
∑
m
p(Y (a,m) = y)p(M(a′) = m)
=
∑
m
p(Y = y |A = a,M = m)p(M = m |A = a′)
Here the first line follows from elementary probability, the second from the cross-world
NPSEM-IE independence:
Y (a,m)⊥⊥M(a′)
which follows from (5); the third follows from the FFRCISTG independence (6) and
thus also from (5). Under the NPSEM-IE associated with Figure 5(a∗) identification
fails because this cross world independence does not hold.
from G. Note that the graph G(a,m) contains the union of edges in the two context-specific SWIGs G(a =
0,m) and G(a = 1, m) shown in Figure 1(c),(d) respectively. G(a,m) thus represents the (non context
specific) conditional independence relations that are common to all four instantiations a,m ∈ {0, 1}.
11The distribution does obey the NPSEM-IE (hence also the FFRCISTG) associated with Figure 1 (a∗)
which includes theM ↔ Y edge; see also footnote 23.
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2.4 Partial Identification of the PDE under the FFRCISTG for
Figure 3(a)
In contrast, under the less restrictive FFRCISTG model associated with the graph
in Figure 3 (a) the PDE is not, in general, identified. This follows from the fact
that the second equality in the previous proof relies on the cross-world independence
Y (a,m)⊥⊥M(a′); but the FFRCISTG model does not assume any cross-world inde-
pendencies. However, under the FFRCISTG the observed data implies bounds on the
PDE. For example, in the case in whichM and Y are binary we have the following
sharp bounds [15]:
max{0, p(M=0 | A=a′) + p(Y =1 | A=a,M=a′]− 1} +
max{0, p(M=1 | A=a′) + p(Y =1 | A=a,M=1]− 1} − p(Y =1 | A = a′)
≤ PDEa,a′ ≤
min{p(M=0 | A=a′), p(Y =1 | A=a,M=a′]} +
min{p(M=1 | A=a′), p(Y =1 | A=a,M=a]} − p(Y =1 | A = a′).
A proof is given in the Appendix.
2.5 A example in which an FFRCISTGmodel holds, but an NPSEM-
IE does not
The differing results on identifiability for the PDE in the previous two sections raise
the question as to whether it is most appropriate to adopt the NPSEM-IE (5) or FFR-
CISTG (6) assumptions in practice. As shown above, this choice matters since, if one
assumes the NPSEM-IE associated with the simple graph in Figure 3 (a) then one will
believe the PDE is point identified, while if one assumes the FFRCISTG associated
with Figure 3 (a) only bounds may be obtained.
It has been argued that it is hard to conceive of a realistic data-generating pro-
cess under which the FFRCISTG model holds, but the NPSEM-IE model does not.
However, we now show that the River Blindness studies, from §4.5 provides a coun-
terexample.
Recall that due to records being destroyed in a fire, only the three variables (A,M ,Y )
are observed. The first (A) is randomly assigned and the analyst assumes (possibly
incorrectly) that there is no other variable (either measured or unmeasured) that is a
cause of both the mediatorM and the final response Y . This hypothesis would imply
the causal structure depicted in Figure 3 (a). The graph in Figure 3 (a) would be the la-
tent projection of Figure 1(a) if it were assumed incorrectly that there is no unmeasured
confounder U . Both the FFRCISTG and NPSEM-IE models associated with Figure 3
(a) imply:
Y (a,m)⊥⊥M(a), for a = 0, 1. (8)
The NPSEM-IE also implies the cross-world independence:
Y (a = 1,m)⊥⊥M(a = 0). (9)
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A a=0 S(a0) s=1
M(a0) m
U R(s1,m)
Y (s1,m)
Figure 2: The SWIG G(a = 0, s = 1,m) associated with the DAG shown in Figure
1(a); here a0 and s1 are short for a = 0 and s = 1.
We have already shown that the underlying data-generating process in the Iver-
mectin example implies (8); see (4) above. We now show that (9) fails to hold for
almost all laws corresponding to the NPSEM-IE associated with Figure 1(a). This
remains true even if we impose, in addition, the context-specific counterfactual inde-
pendences needed to identify the CDE that are encoded in Figures 1 (c) and (d).
To see this, first consider the SWIG G(a = 0, s = 1,m) shown in Figure 2 that is
constructed from the DAG in Figure 1(a). There is a d-connecting path Y (s = 1,m) to
M(a = 0), namelyM(a = 0)← U → R(s = 1,m)→ Y (s = 1,m). Consequently,
for almost all distributions in the FFRCISTG model, it holds thatM(a = 0) 6⊥⊥ Y (s =
1,m).12 Further, we have:
Y (s = 1,m) = Y (S(a = 1),m) = Y (a = 1,m),
where in the first equality we use that, due to determinism, S(a = 1) = 1 for
all individuals; the second follows from recursive substitution13 Hence (9) does not
hold14from which it follows that the PDE is not identified; see Appendix §6.2. Con-
sequently the distribution of the counterfactuals {A,M(a), Y (a,m) for all a,m} is
not in the NPSEM-IE model associated with Figure 3(a). Interestingly we see that
by considering a SWIG with interventions on three variables A, S and M we have
shown that the FFRCISTG model plus recursive substitution and some determinism
can be used to prove that a cross world independence fails to hold; see footnote 23 and
Appendix §6.3.
Finally we note that in the Ivermectin example the ADMG with fewest edges (over
A, M , Y ) that represents the distribution of the counterfactuals {A,M(a), Y (a,m)
for all a,m} is Figure 3 (a) under the FFRCISTG. In contrast, the minimal ADMG
that represents this distribution under the NPSEM-IE is the graph with an additional
bi-directed confounding arc shown in Figure 1(a∗). This has the following interesting
consequence: typically people may make a statement such as “Figure 3 (a) is the true
causal graph.” However, we now see that this statement does not have a truth-value
12This is also true if we assume the NPSEM-IE associated with the graph in Figure 1(a).
13 See Equation (1) in [20].
14Intuitively, this should not be surprising since U is a ‘common cause’ ofM(a = 0) and Y (a = 1, m)
in that U →M(a = 0) in Fig. 1(c) while there is a path U → R(a = 1, m)→ Y (a = 1, m) in Fig. 1(d).
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without clarifying whether we are referring to the NPSEM-IE or the FFRCISTG as the
true underlying counterfactual model.
On the other hand, one might prefer to replace “Figure 3(a)” with “Figure 1(a∗)”
in the statement above, since then the modified statement holds for both counterfactual
models;15 furthermore, Figure 1(a∗) accurately indicates that there is confounding for
the PDE. However, the disadvantage of this choice is that the inclusion of the bi-
directed edgeM↔Y does not reveal that the CDE is identified via E[Y (a,m) |A =
a,M = m] = E[Y |A = a,M = m].
2.6 Testable versus Untestable Assumptions and Identifiability
Given a graph such as Figure 3 (a), in principle, there is an empirical test of the FFR-
CISTG model.16 However, there is no additional empirical test (on the variables in
the graph) for the extra assumptions made by the corresponding NPSEM-IE, which are
required to identify the PDE. Consequently, there is a qualitative distinction in the
testability of the identification assumptions for these two contrasts.
In more detail, identification of the CDE(m), m = 0, 1 is, in principle, subject
to direct empirical test: one conducts a four armed randomized experiment on subjects
drawn from the same population, in which both A and M are randomly assigned to
their four possible joint values. If for any (a,m) the distribution in the four-arm (A,M)
randomized trial p(Y (a,m) = y)17 differs from the conditional distribution in the two-
armed trial p(Y (a) = y |M(a) = m) = p(Y = y |M = m,A = a) in which only
A was randomized, then we may infer that an unmeasured common cause was present
between M and Y and hence it was incorrect to postulate the causal DAG in Figure
3 (a), regardless of whether we are considering the FFRCISTG or NPSEM-IE models
associated with this graph.
In contrast, whether the PDE equals the mediation formula (7) cannot be em-
pirically tested using data on (A,M, Y ). Even if we can directly manipulate M (in
addition to A), there is no experiment involving A andM such that the resulting con-
trast corresponds to the PDE. This is for the following reason: to observe, for a given
subject, the cross-world counterfactual Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) that occurs in the PDE,
one would need to ‘first’ assign them to a = 0 and recordM(a = 0), and ‘then’ per-
form a ‘second’ experiment (on the same subject) in which they are assigned to a = 1
and the recorded value M(a = 0) from the ‘first’ experiment. However, this is usu-
ally not possible for the simple reason that having assigned the patient to a = 0 in the
‘first’ experiment, precludes ‘subsequently’ assigning them to a = 1, except in the rare
circumstances where a valid cross-over trial is feasible.
15Since the distribution of {A,M(a), Y (a,m) for all a,m} obeys the FFRCISTG corresponding to
Figure 3(a), which is a subgraph of Figure 1(a∗), the distribution also obeys the FFRCISTG corresponding
to this latter graph.
16Formally, this requires that one can observe the ‘natural’ value of a variable prior to intervention.
17Here and throughout this section, we will use p(A,M,Y ) to denote the observed distribution in which
only A is randomized; we will use {p(Y (a,m)) for a,m ∈ {0, 1} to indicate the four distributions that
would be observed if bothA andM were to be randomized in a four arm trial. This is because in such a trial
in the arm in which people are assigned to A = a,M = m we would observe the counterfactual Y (a,m).
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These considerations are particularly relevant in a setting such as the Ivermectin
example, where as shown above, the distribution over the counterfactual variables
{A,M(a), Y (a,m) for all a,m} obeys the FFRCISTG but not the NPSEM-IE model
associated with the causal DAG in Figure 3(a). In particular, an analyst who was un-
aware of the variables U , R, S in Figure 1(a) and posited the model in Figure 3 (a)
would find no evidence of confounding betweenM and Y even if they were to subse-
quently perform a four-arm (A,M) randomized trial.
In summary, the PDE identification via the mediation formula (7) requires not
only that there be no detectable single-world confounding between M and Y (as as-
sumed by the FFRCISTG), but, in addition, that undetectable cross-world confounding
also be absent.18 Consequently, as with the Ivermectin example, it is possible for the
mediation formula to give an inconsistent estimate of the PDE, yet for this to be unde-
tectable given any randomized experiment that could be performed using the variables
A,M , Y on the graph in Figure 3(a).
3 Interventionist Theory of Mediation
The above considerations motivate a theory of mediation based on interventions on
sub-components of treatment, rather than on the mediator.
3.1 Interventional interpretation of the PDE under an expanded
graph
As described above, the counterfactual E[Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))] and thus the PDE
cannot be empirically tested by any intervention on the variables on the graph. How-
ever, curiously, Pearl has often argued that the PDE is a causal contrast of substantive
and public-health importance by offering examples along the following lines.
Example: Nicotine-Free Cigarette
Consider the example discussed in §2 where we have data from a randomized smoking-
cessation trial. We have data available on smoking status A, hypertensive status M 6
months after randomization and Myocardial Infarction (MI) status Y at one year.
Following a similar argument given in [6]19 to motivate the PDE, suppose that
nicotine-free cigarettes will be newly available starting a year from now. The sub-
stantive goal is to use the already collected data from the smoking cessation trial to
estimate the difference two years from now in the incidence of MI if all smokers were
to change to nicotine-free cigarettes when they become available (in a year) compared
to the incidence if all smokers were to stop smoking altogether (in a year).
18If, after carrying out an experiment in which A and M are randomly assigned, it is observed that
p(Y (a,m)) and p(Y |A = a,M = m) are statistically indistinguishable, then this would almost cer-
tainly increase the probability that a Bayesian would assign to cross-world independence holding. However,
the Ivermectin example shows the importance of the investigator – Bayesian or not – thinking carefully about
the underlying data-generating mechanism.
19[6] §2 considers a similar example, but where A is a drug, M is aspirin taken to mitigate side-effects,
and Y is the final outcome.
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Figure 3: (a) A simple DAG G representing a causal model with a treatment A, a
mediator M and a response Y . (b) An expanded causal model where N and O are a
decomposition of A; N and O are, respectively, the nicotine and non-nicotine compo-
nents of tobacco. Thicker red edges indicate deterministic relations. (c) An expanded
version Gex of the DAG G in (a), and an edge subgraph of the DAG in (b), where N
does not cause Y directly, andO does not causeM directly. In this graph the direct and
indirect effects of A on Y may be defined via interventions on N and O. (d) Special
case of (c) in which A plays the role of O; (e) Special case of (c) in which A plays the
role of N .
Further suppose it is believed that the entire effect of nicotine on MI is through its
effect on hypertensive status, while the non-nicotine toxins in cigarettes have no effect
on hypertension and that there do not exist unmeasured confounders for the effect of
hypertension on MI.
In this context a researcher following the approach that has been advocated by Pearl
may postulate that the smoking cessation trial is represented by the NPSEM-IE model
associated with Figure 3 (a). Under these assumptions, the MI incidence in smokers
of cigarettes free of nicotine would be E [Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))] since the hypertensive
status of smokers of nicotine-free cigarettes will equal their hypertensive status under
non-exposure to cigarettes. ThusE [Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))] is precisely the incidence of
MI in smokers 2 years from now were all smokers to change to nicotine-free cigarettes
a year from now, and thus the PDE:
PDE = E [Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))]− E [Y (a = 0,M(a = 0))] (10)
is the causal contrast of interest.
Given the assumption of an NPSEM-IE it follows that E [Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))]
equals
∑
mE [Y |A = 1,M = m] p(m |A = 0), and therefore the PDE is identified
from the mediation formula applied to the data from the smoking cessation trial.
What is interesting about Pearl’s motivation is that to argue for the substantive
importance of the parameter E[Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))], he tells a story about the effect
of a manipulation — a manipulation that makes no reference to M at all. Rather, in
this context, the manipulation is to intervene to eliminate the nicotine component of
cigarettes.
The most direct representation of this story is provided by the expandedDAG Gex in
Figure 3(c) where N is a binary variable representing nicotine exposure,O is a binary
variable representing exposure to the other non-nicotine components of a cigarette.
The bolded arrows from A to N and O indicate deterministic relationships: N(a) =
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O(a) = a. This is because in the factual data (with probability one) either one smokes
normal cigarettes so A = N = O = 1 or one is a nonsmoker (i.e. ex-smoker) and
A = N = O = 0.
This expanded graph now provides a simple interventional interpretation of the
PDE. The researcher’s assumption of the NPSEM-IE associated with Figure 3 (a)
together with the existence of the variables N and O and associated counterfactuals
imply the nested counterfactual Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) is equal to the simple counter-
factual Y (n = 0, o = 1), the outcome had we intervened to expose all subjects to the
non-nicotine components, but not to the nicotine components.20 It follows that
PDE = E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)]− E[Y (n = 0, o = 0)]. (11)
Furthermore these assumptions imply that the graph in Figure 3 (c) is an FFRCISTG.
It then follows from Proposition 3 in [20] that
E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] =
∑
m
E[Y |O = 1,M = m]p(m |N = 0), (12)
where the RHS is the g-formula. Thus E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] is identified provided that
the terms in the g-formula are functions of the distribution of the factuals p(A,N,O,M, Y ).
Since in the factual data now available there is no subject with N = 0 and O = 1 pos-
itivity fails and one might suppose that E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] is not identified, but in
fact it is. To see this, note that the event {O = 1,M = m} is equal to the event
{A = 1,M = m} and similarly the event {N = 0,M = m} is equal to the event
{A = 0,M = m} owing to determinism. Thus by substituting these events we con-
clude that
E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] =
∑
m
E[Y |A = 1,M = m]p(m |A = 0), (13)
which coincides with (one of the terms in) the mediation formula.21
20Notice that here we show that the ‘cross-world’ counterfactual Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) defined in the
DAG in Figure 3(a) is equal (as a random variable) to the ‘non-cross cross-world’ counterfactual Y (n =
0, o = 1) associated with the DAG in Figure 3(c); see §3.6 for further discussion.
21Implications of Determinism: The FFRCISTG models associated with Figures 3(b) and (c) both imply
the factuals (A,N,O,M, Y ) factor with respect to the corresponding graph. Now in Figure 3(c) note (i) N
is d-separated from Y given {M,O} and (ii)O is d-separated fromM givenN which implyN⊥⊥Y | O,M
and O⊥⊥M | N , respectively. In contrast on Figure 3(b) neither of the above d-separations hold. Yet, since
by the determinism A = N = O as random variables, both independencies also hold for the DAG in Figure
3(b).
Furthermore, E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] would be identified by the g-formula:
∑
m
E[Y |N = 0, O = 1,M = m]p(m |N = 0, O = 1)
were the formula a function of the factual distribution. However, it is not because the event {N = 0, O = 1}
has probability zero due to determinism. Notwithstanding this, a naive application of the above indepen-
dences might lead one to conclude that this g-formula is equal to the RHS of (12) and thus is identified
by (13). The error in this argument is that O⊥⊥M | N does not imply p(M = m |N = 0) equals
p(M = m |N = 0, O = 1) when the event {O = 1, N = 0} has probability zero, since the latter is not
well-defined.
Note that, in the presence of determinism, we have two DAGs with different adjacencies that represent
the set of distributions. The counterfactuals corresponding to the DAGs in Figures 3(b) and (c) do not
represent the same set of counterfactual distributions; see footnote 27.
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For a researcher following [6], having at the outset assumed an NPSEM-IE asso-
ciated with the DAG in Figure 3(a), the story involving N and O does not contribute
to identification; rather, it served only to show that the PDE encodes a substantively
important parameter.
However, from the FFRCISTG point of view, the story not only provides an in-
terventional interpretation of the PDE but in addition makes the PDE identifiable
with the mediation formula being the identifying formula. Furthermore, Pearl’s story
makes refutable the claim that the PDE is identified by the mediation formula. Specif-
ically, when nicotine-free cigarettes become available, Pearl’s claim can be tested by
an intervention that forces a random sample of the population to smoke nicotine-free
cigarettes; if the mean of Y under this intervention differs from the RHS of (12) Pearl’s
claim is falsified. As this refers to an an actual intervention, the variables (N,O) are
not simply formal constructions. Without knowledge of the substantive meaning of N
and O the trial in which N is set to 0 and O is set to 1 is not possible, even in princi-
ple. See [15] and [25] for discussion of substantive considerations regarding whether
variablesN and O exist that satisfy the no direct effect assumptions of Figure 3(c).22
Remark 1 It should be noted that, in the following sense, it is sufficient to find one of
the variablesN orO: Specifically, if we have a well-defined interventionN , satisfying:
(n1) N(a) = a so thatN = A in the observed data;
(n2) N has no direct effect on Y relative to A andM , so Y (a, n,m) = Y (a,m);
(n3) A has no direct effect onM relative to N soM(a, n) = M(n),
then A will satisfy the conditions for O; see Figure 3 (d). Conversely, if there is a
well-defined intervention O such that:
(o1) O(a) = a so that O = A in the observed data;
(o2) A has no direct effect on Y relative to O andM , so Y (a, o,m) = Y (o,m);
(o3) O has no direct effect onM relative to A soM(a, o) =M(a),
then A will satisfy the conditions forN ; see Figure 3 (e).
We use all three variables (A,N,O) in our subsequent development since this
choice is symmetric in N and O, covers both cases and more closely aligns with the
original motivating Nicotine intervention.
Lastly, note that, as in the Ivermectin example, the existence of the interventions
N , O satisfying the no direct effect conditions do not imply that the mediation formula
identifies the PDE, because confounding betweenM and Y may still be present.23
22One can trivially construct artificial variables N∗ ≡ A and O∗ ≡ A such that the (degenerate) joint
distribution of the factuals p(A,N∗, O∗,M, Y ) will factorize according to the DAG in Figure 3(c) and
thus satisfyM⊥⊥O∗, A | N∗ and Y⊥⊥N∗ | A,O∗,M . However, these latter independencies are tautolo-
gies owing to determinism and thus do not establish e.g. Y (o,m)⊥⊥M(n) as required by the FFRCISTG
associated with Figure 3(c).
23 An attentive reader might wonder how it is that the mediation formula fails to identify P (Y (n, o)) in the
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3.2 Direct and Indirect Effects via the Expanded Graph
In this section we formally introduce the interventionist theory of mediation introduced
in [15] and greatly generalized herein. We do so by continuing with the Nicotine
Example. Recall that N and O were substantively meaningful variables and the goal
was to use data from a smoking cessation trial to estimate E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)], the
incidence of MI through year 2 if all smokers were to change to nicotine-free cigarettes
at one year. Consideration of this policy intervention was used by Pearl to motivate
consideration of the PDE. However, given the public health importance of the policy
question, one could instead focus directly on estimating the effect of the proposed
substantive intervention given data on (A,M, Y ) without regard to whether it is equal
to the PDE.
In fact, there are many situations where mediation analysis is applied, in which in-
terventions on the putative mediatorM are not well-defined. Consequently, substantive
researchers may not wish to make reference to the corresponding counterfactuals,24 re-
gardless of whether they may be formally constructed. For such researchers, the PDE
parameter may not be substantively meaningful. Fortunately, the interventionist theory
described herein, in contrast to Pearl’s approach, does not require reference to counter-
factuals indexed bym, such as Y (a,m).25
As noted, the interventionist theory only requires that N , O, and interventions on
them are substantively meaningful. This is a major advantage since it makes it straight-
forward to discuss with subject matter experts, e.g. physicians, experiments that would
shed light on causal pathways; this is a property not shared by the PDE.
Up to this point we have motivated our interventionist theory, based on the ex-
panded graph, as providing an empiricist foundation for the existing mediation theory
that is based on cross-world (nested) counterfactuals. However, the interventionist
theory can be viewed as autonomous,26 providing a self-contained framework for dis-
cussing mediation without reference to cross-world (i.e. nested) counterfactuals. In
this section, we adopt this viewpoint. However we will see that we can prove the two
Ivermectin example (withA as “N” and S as “O”; see Remark 1 above). As noted earlier, the counterfactual
variables A,M(a), Y (a,m) follow the conditional independences implied by the FFRCISTGmodel associ-
ated with the DAG in Figure 3(a) (in which there is no bi-directed arc betweenM and Y ); see the end of §2.5.
Under this FFRCISTGmodel, the absence of theM ↔ Y edge implies that there is no confounding between
M and Y that is detectable via interventions on A andM , since p(Y (a,m)) = p(Y |A=a,M=m).
However, in the Ivermectin example, the expanded set of counterfactual variables A,O,M(a), Y (a, o)
do not follow the FFRCISTG model corresponding to the DAG in Figure 3(e). To see this, consider perform-
ing, in addition to the randomized trial where a = 1 and s = 1, an intervention setting A to 0 and O ≡ S
to 1, which corresponds to an observational study but with clinics and immuno suppressants. Notice that the
confounding variable U in Figure 1(a) now becomes detectable in the following sense: If U were not present
in Figure 13(a) then p(Y (a=0, s = 1) |M(a=0)) = p(Y (a=1, s = 1) |M(a=1)). This follows from
Rule 3 of the po-calculus [5, 20] applied to the SWIG G(a, s) derived from Figure 3(e) after replacing “O”
with S. However, we show in Appendix §6.3 that in this example, if U is present then this equality does not
hold. Consequently, the latent projection over the variables A,O ≡ S,M, Y includes an M ↔ Y edge;
see also the last paragraph of §2.6.
24We regard the existence of interventions as necessary for counterfactuals to be well-defined, but [9, 10]
and others may take a different view.
25The CDE(m) and PDE are defined in terms of such counterfactuals.
26Following [28, §6.54], we may view the theory based on nested counterfactuals as a ‘ladder’ that we
climbed to reach our empiricist theory, and now having done so, we may choose to ‘kick it away’.
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theories are tightly coupled in certain settings; see §3.6.
Concretely, consider the DAG associated with Figure 3 (b). Unlike the model asso-
ciated with Figure 3 (a), which involves counterfactualsM(a) and Y (a), the expanded
FFRCISTG model associated with Figure 3 (b) involves counterfactualsM(n, o) and
Y (n, o). Taking the interventionist view as primitive, in what follows, we will dis-
cuss counterfactuals, such as Y (n = 0, o = 1) that, without further assumptions, are
defined solely within this larger expanded model.
Identification of four arms from two
For the purposes of our development, consider the following three datasets all derived
from the same distribution p over the one step ahead counterfactuals in the FFRCISTG
model associated with the graph in Figure 3(b)
(i) The original observed data from the trial in which A was randomized, namely
A,M , Y ;
(ii) Data from a putative four arm (N,O) randomized trial; the data in each arm
(n, o) ∈ {0, 1}2 corresponds toM(n, o), Y (n, o);
(iii) A dataset obtained from the four arm (N,O) trial (ii) by restricting to the two
arms in which n = o.
Note that in dataset (i) among people with A = a we observe N = O = a, owing
to determinism; hence we observeM(n=a, o=a) and Y (n=a, o=a) on this event.
By randomization of A, it follows that for a ∈ {0, 1},
p(M = m,Y = y |A = a) = p(M(n=a, o= a) = m,Y (n=a, o= a) = y |A = a)
= p(M(n=a, o= a) = m,Y (n=a, o= a) = y)
which is the distribution of individuals in dataset (iii). We conclude that the distribution
of the data in (iii) is identified from the observed data (i). Thus our goal becomes the
identification of E[Y (n, o)] for n 6= o from data on M(n, o) and Y (n, o) in the two
arms with n = o. Motivated by the nomenclature of [25] when this identification is
possible we will say that the effects of N and O on M and Y are separable. The
following Proposition provides sufficient conditions.
Identifying the results of a future four arm study from a current two arm study
Proposition 1 If for some x ∈ {0, 1} the following two conditions hold:
p(M(n=x, o=0) = m) = p(M(n=x, o=1) = m), (14)
p(Y (n=1, o=x∗) = y |M(n=1, o=x∗) = m)
= p(Y (n=0, o=x∗) = y |M(n=0, o=x∗) = m), (15)
where x∗ = 1− x, then:
p(M(n=x, o=x∗) = m,Y (n=x, o=x∗) = y) (16)
= p(Y (n=x∗, o=x∗) = y |M(n=x∗, o=x∗) = m)p(M(n=x, o=x) = m).
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Note that by consistency and randomization of A in dataset (i) the RHS of (16), when
summed over m is simply the mediation formula (7). Hence under (15) and (14)
E[Y (n, 0)] is identified from data set (iii) by the mediation formula.
Proof:
p(M(n=x, o=x∗), Y (n=x, o=x∗))
= p(Y (n=x, o=x∗) |M(n=x, o=x∗))p(M(n=x, o=x∗))
= p(Y (n=x∗, o=x∗) |M(n=x∗, o=x∗))p(M(n=x, o=x)).
The constraints in (15) and (14) are implied by the SWIG given in Figure 4(b) with
treatments n and o over the random variables variables N , O, M(n, o) and Y (n, o).27
Note that Y (n, o) is d-separated from the fixed node n givenM(n, 0), which implies
under the SWIG global Markov property that the distribution p(Y (n, o) |M(n, o))
does not depend on n, which is equivalent to (15).
Similarly, since M(n, o) is d-separated from the fixed node o, p(M(n, o)) does
not depend on o. Thus we see that the constraints (14) are implied by the FFRCISTG
model.
Thus the identifiability result in Proposition 1 follows from the fact in the SWIG in
Figure 4(b), there is no variable whose conditional distributional distribution, given its
(random) parents, depends on both n and o.
Proposition 1 above, and indeed all the results in the remainder of this subsection,
holds, when counterfactuals indexed by the mediator m are not well-defined. Recall
that [13, 15] develop an FFRCISTG model in which only interventions on a subset of
variables are considered well-defined.
Remarks:
1. The reader may wonder why in this SWIG we have labeledM with (n, o), rather
than the minimal labeling. This is to emphasize that in this subsection our re-
sults do not require the assumption that missing arrows on a SWIG imply the
absence of the associated direct effect for all individuals. Rather in this sub-
section we only impose the weaker assumption that any SWIG is a ‘population
causal graph.’ A population causal graph [12, §7] assumes the distribution of
the variables on the graph factor according to the graph, but does not impose
the assumption that a missing arrow implies no individual level effects. Thus
the variable M(n, o) need not equal the variable M(n) = M(n,O) and thus
M(n, o) cannot be labelled as M(n). That is, in the underlying FFRCISTG
model associated with the SWIG the one step ahead counterfactualsM(n, o) de-
pend on both n and o. In other words, this population FFRCISTG corresponds
to an NPSEM associated with a complete graph consistent with the ordering of
27Thus although, as noted previously in footnote 21, under determinism, the DAGs in Figure 3(b),(c) imply
the same conditional independence relations on p(A,M, Y,N,O), they lead to different counterfactual
models, since the constraints (15) and (14) are implied by the SWIG in Figure 4(b), but not the SWIG in
Figure 4(a).
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the vertices. It does not correspond to an NPSEM associated with the SWIG; see
also Footnotes 17, 22 and §6.2. In particular, under the SWIG derived from the
population graph the constraints (15) and (14) correspond to the absence of the
edges n→ Y (n, o) and o→M(n, o) respectively.
2. Since (15) and (14) are restrictions on the distribution of the counterfactuals in
Figure 4(b), there exist consistent tests of the conditions (15) and (14) given the
data from (ii). These conditions cannot be tested given only the data (iii) (or
equivalently (i)).28
3. We have seen that under the FFRCISTG associated with Figure 4(b), the dis-
tribution of Y (n, o) for all four arms is identified from the two arms in which
n = o; thus the structure of this SWIG is sufficient for this identification. How-
ever, this structure is also ‘necessary’ in that it is the only population SWIG over
M(n, o) and Y (n, o) where this identification is possible.29 To see this, first
note that if Y (n, o) depends on both n and o then n and o are both ancestors of
Y . By Proposition 2 below, if n and o are both parents of Y , then identifiabil-
ity fails to hold. Given that we only have one other measured variable then this
implies that we must have one fixed node a parent ofM andM in turn a parent
of Y ; the other fixed node is then a parent of Y . If any other edges are present
between {n, o} and {M(n, o), Y (n, o)} then again by Proposition 2, the condi-
tional distributions will not be identifiable. Likewise, if there is an unmeasured
confounder betweenM and Y then Y (n, o)will not be d-separated from n given
M(n, o).
We have the following more general result.
Proposition 2 Assume the distribution of the variables on an unexpanded DAG G is
positive. Under an FFRCISTG corresponding to the population SWIG Gex(n, o) there
is no vertex that has both n and o as parents if and only if the joint distributions
p(V (n = x, o = x∗)) for x 6= x∗ are identified from the counterfactual distributions
p(V (n=x, o=x)). Further, since P (V (n=x, o=x)) = P (V (a=x)), also from the
distribution of the variables in G.30
Proof: Consider the g-formula of Proposition 3 in [20] applied to the graph Gex
under an intervention on n and o. This formula is a function of the joint distribution of
the observables if and only if none of the terms in the g-formula have bothN and O in
the conditioning event. Note that each term in the g-formula is the conditional distribu-
tion of a variable given its parents on the population SWIG Gex(n, o). The requirement
here that there is no vertex that is a child of both n and o is directly analogous to the
‘no recanting witness’ condition in theory developed by [2].
28We note that consistent tests of individual level no direct effect conditions such as Y (n, o) = Y (o)
do not exist since it is possible that E[Y (n, o)] = E[Y (n, o′)] and yet Y (n, o) 6= Y (n, o′) (as random
variables).
29Here we are ignoring the structure relating the random variables N and O.
30Note that the result here holds because the DAG G here does not contain hidden variables.
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Consider the following examples from [15]. Suppose our original causal graph
G in Figure 3(a) for the cigarette cessation trial was incorrect and the correct causal
graph is shown in Figure 5(a). There exist three possible (N,O) elaborations of this
graph, which are shown in Figure 6. These represent different causal theories about
the causal effect of the treatment variables N , O on L, M and Y . Figure 7 shows the
corresponding population SWIGs. Under the SWIGs in Figure 7 (a), (b) the distribution
of the four arms Y (n, o) is identified given the distributions Y (n=x, o=x):
p(Y (x, x∗)) =
∑
m,l
p(Y (x∗, x∗) |M(x∗, x∗), L(x∗, x∗))p(M(x, x) |L(x, x))p(L(x, x))
=
∑
m,l
p(Y |m, l, a = x∗)p(m | l, a = x)p(l | a = x) (17)
and
p(Y (x, x∗)) =
∑
m,l
p(Y (x∗, x∗) |M(x∗, x∗), L(x∗, x∗))p(M(x, x) |L(x, x))p(L(x∗ , x∗))
=
∑
m,l
p(Y |m, l, a = x∗)p(m | l, a = x)p(l | a = x∗) (18)
respectively, where here we are using Y (i, j) to denote Y (n= i, o= j). Note that the
identifying formulae are different. See [24] for generalizations of these results.
In contrast, under the SWIG in Figure 7(c), p(Y (n, o)) for n 6= o is not identified
from the data on the two arms with n = o (equivalently the observed data) because
in Gex L has both N and O as parents; hence the term p(l | n = x, o = x∗) in the
g-formula for p(Y (x, x∗)) is not a function of the observed data.
Given thatN andO are real interventions at most one of the expanded causal graphs
shown in Figure 6 can represent the true causal structure. If, in the future, we obtain
data from a four arm (N,O) trial we can test between the three competing theories
associated with these expanded graphs.31
3.3 Expanded graphs for a single treatment
We formally define expanded graphs as follows:
Given a DAG G with a single treatment variable A, an expanded graph Gex for A
is a DAG constructed by first adding a set of new variables {A(1), . . . , A(p)} corre-
sponding to a decomposition of the treatment A into p separate components (proposed
by the investigator); every variable A(i) is a child of A with the same state space and
A(i)(a) = a, but A has no other children in Gex; each child Cj of A in G has in G
ex a
subset of {A(1), . . . , A(p)} as its set of parents.
31Note however, that if the results from the four arm trial do not correspond to the identifying formulae
obtained from either Figure 7(a) or (b), then although it is possible that the DAG in Figure 7(c), it is also
possible that the true graph could correspond to Figure 7(a) or (b) with an added unmeasured confounder
between any pair of the variables L,M and Y .
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A N n
O o
M(n, o)
Y (n, o)
(a)
A N n
O o
M(n, o)
Y (n, o)
(b)
Figure 4: (a),(b) SWIGs derived from the corresponding expanded DAGs Gex shown
in Figures 3(b),(c) respectively. In the SWIG shown in (b), the mediator is labeled
M(n, o) to indicate that this is a population FFRCISTG for Gex, which does not as-
sume the absence of individual level direct effects.
A M
Y
L
(a)
A M
Y
H
(b)
Figure 5: (a) DAG containing an observed common cause L of the mediatorM and
outcome Y that is also caused byA; (b) DAG containing an unobserved common cause
H of the mediatorM and outcome Y .
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(c)
Figure 6: Elaborations of the graph in Figure 5 (a), with additional edges. These
represent different causal theories about the causal effect of the treatment variablesN ,
O on L,M , Y . As before, the thicker red edges indicate deterministic relations.
A
N n
O o
M(n, o) L(n, o)
Y (n, o)
(a)
A
N n
O o
M(n, o) L(n, o)
Y (n, o)
(b)
A
N n
O o
M(n, o) L(n, o)
Y (n, o)
(c)
Figure 7: Three different population SWIGs associated with the three expanded DAGs
shown in Figure 6. Under the SWIGs (a), (b) the effects ofN andO on Y are separable
so that the distribution of Y (n, o) in the four arms are identified given the distribution
of Y (n = x, o = x) although the identification formulae differ; (c) A SWIG under
which the four arms Y (n, o) are not identified from the two arms Y (n=x, o=x).
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Lemma 1 Assume the distribution of the variables on an unexpanded DAG G is posi-
tive. Under an FFRCISTG corresponding to an expanded (population) graph Gex for
treatment A, the intervention distribution p(V (a(1) = x(1), . . . , a(p) = x(p))) is iden-
tified by the g-formula applied to Gex from the data on G if for every child Cj of A in
G, the set of parents of Cj in G
ex that are components of A take the same value.32
Proof:As in the proof of Proposition 2, consider the g-formula for p(V (a(1)=x(1), . . . ,
a(p)=x(p))) of Proposition 3 in [20] applied to the graph Gex. The g-formula will be
a function of the joint distribution of the observables since each term in the g-formula
always conditions on a single value of A.
[15, §6.2] also described the special case in which each child Cj of A in G has
exactly one component A(j) as a parent.33 We will refer to this as the edge expanded
graph for A, which we often denote as Gedge. In this case p = | chG(A)| and in
this special case Gex corresponds to the graph formed from G by replacing each edge
A → Cj with A→A
(j) → Cj . Note that G
edge is unique.34 See Figure 9 for an
example.
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, if Gex is the edge expanded graph
Gedge forA then for all assignments x(1), . . . , x(p) p(V (a(1) = x(1), . . . , a(p) = x(p)))
is identified from the data on G.
When the conditions of this Corollary hold, we will say, following the nomenclature
in [25], that the treatment components {A(1), . . . , A(p)} have separable effects.
3.4 On the substantive relationship between different Gex graphs
and Gedge
In the context of the smoking cessation trial recall that the two expanded graphs in
Figure 6 (a),(b) led to different identifying formulae for P (Y (n = x, o = x∗)) given,
respectively, by (17) and (18). The identifying formulae also arise in the context of the
graph Gedge shown in Figure 9. Specifically, p(Y (a(1) = x, a(2) = x, a(3) = x∗))
and p(Y (a(1) = x∗, a(2) = x, a(3) = x∗)) are identified by (17) and (18) respec-
tively. The FFRCISTG models associated with the expanded graphs shown in Figure 6
(a),(b) correspond to distinct mutually exclusive causal structures, which lead to differ-
ent identifying formulae for the distribution of the counterfactual Y (n = x, o = x∗) in
an arm of the four arm (N,O) trial in which one intervenes to set n = x, and o = x∗.
However, given the FFRCISTG model corresponding to the graph in Figure 9, we are
able to interpret the identifying expressions (17) and (18) as identifying two different
interventions on A(1), A(2), and A(3) on a single graph Gedge.
32More formally, we require that for all Cj ∈ chG(A), if A
(k), A(l) ∈ paGex(Cj)∩{A
(1) , . . . , A(p)}
then x(k) = x(l).
33More formally, we have that for all children Cj of A, paGex(Cj) ∩ {A
(1), . . . , A(p)} = {A(j)}.
34Since the expanded graph Gedge for A postulates a separate component of treatment corresponding to
each child of A, such a graph will be unlikely to represent the substantive understanding of an investigator
when p is large.
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[15] note that the above may seem to, but do not, contradict one another. Recall
that N and O represent the substantive variables recording the presence or absence of
Nicotine and all Other cigarette components.
Suppose we further divide the Other cigarette components into Tar (T ) and cigarette
components other than tar and nicotine (O∗). Thus substantively setting O to a value
corresponds to setting both O∗ and T to that value. Furthermore, the graph Gedge
in Figure 9 being an FFRCISTG implies that the graph Gex in Figure 6(b) formed
by (re)combining O∗ and T is is an FFRCISTG. Thus an intervention setting (O =
x,N = x∗) on Figure 6(b) substantively corresponds to the intervention on the graph
Gedge in Figure 9 with O∗ = A(3) = x, T = A(1) = x, N = A(2) = x∗. Thus these
interventions in this Gex and in Gedge give the same identifying formula (18).
Given we have locked in the substantive interpretation of the A(j) in Figure 9,
the intervention O∗ ≡ A(3) = x, T ≡ A(1) = x∗, N ≡ A(2) = x∗ on Figure
9 corresponds to the intervention in which N and T are set to the same value and
thus does not represent a joint intervention on the substantive variables N and O ≡
(O∗, T ). However, the identifying formula for this intervention if Figure 9 were the
causal graph generating the causal graph happens to have the same identifying formula
(17) as the intervention setting O = x, N = x∗ if Figure 6(a) were the causal graph.
This might seem surprising since, under the substantive meanings of the components
(A(1), A(2), A(3)), specifically, A(2) ≡ N , Figure 9 is compatible with Figure 6(b)
and not Figure 6(a). However, it is not surprising from a formal perspective, if we
notice that by considering a DAG with the same structure as Figure 6(a), but in which
N is replaced by a variable N † ≡ N ×T indicating the presence of both Tar and
Nicotine, then we may represent the intervention that sets O∗ = x, N = T = x∗ via
an intervention onN † and O∗.35
If, instead of dividing O, one divides Nicotine, N , into sub-components corre-
sponding to two different isotopes and re-defines the variables in Figure 9 as A(1) ≡
Nicotine Isotope 1, A(2) ≡ Nicotine Isotope 2, A(3) ≡ O then the mirror image of the
above holds. Specifically, Figure 9 is compatible with Figure 6(a),36 and not Figure 6
(b).
Note however, that there is no way to re-define A(1), A(2), and A(3) such that
Figure 9 is compatible with Figure 6(c). Specifically, an intervention setting N = x
and O = x∗ 6= x cannot be represented via an intervention on (A(1), A(2), A(3)),
since in Figure 6(c) L has two parents N and O while in Figure 6(c) L has only one.
Of course this must be the case because the intervention on N and O in Figure 6(c)
is not identified from the observed data, while, by Corollary 1 any intervention on
A(1), A(2), A(3) on graph Figure 9 is identified.
Lastly, note that Gedge assumes that A(1), A(2), and A(3) each directly affect only
L,M and Y , respectively; this hypothesis could, in principle, be tested if one were to
perform an eight arm (A(1), A(2), A(3)) trial.
35Though the graph constructed in this way has the same topology as Figure 6(a), it represents a different
substantive hypothesis, since a component ofN† is a parent of L.
36Figure 6(a) with the variables N and O (not N† and O).
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In general, if Gex is an FFRCISTG with separable (hence, identified) effects and
further Gedge is an FFRCISTG, then the counterfactual variables in Gex may be ob-
tained from those in Gedge by imposing the equality a(i) = a(j) whenever the corre-
sponding children Ci and Cj ofA in G share a common parent in G
ex. Note that this is
directly analogous to the way in which the counterfactual variables Vi(a) in G(a) are
equal to the counterfactuals Vi(n = a, o = a) present in G(n, o).
3.5 Generalizations
The foregoing development may be further generalized in several ways:
(a) Rather than having data from a single treatment variable A, we may consider a
study in which there were multiple treatment variables {A1, . . . , Ak}. In this set-
ting it may be of interest to attempt to identify the distributionV (n1, o1, . . . , nk, ok)
of a hypothetical future study where Ni and Oi are components of Ai such that
in the original study Ai = Oi = Ni. See Figure 10. More generally each Ai
may have pi components. The natural generalization of Lemma 1 holds.
37
(b) We may consider a setting in which some variables (H) in the underlying causal
DAG G(V ∪H) are not observed; though variables we intervene on are observed,
so A ⊆ V .
Here, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we check identification of a
standard interventional distribution. Specifically, we construct an ADMG Gex
containing the variables {N1, O1, . . . , Nk, Ok}, such that Ni and Oi have only
Ai as a parent; the only edges with an arrowhead at Ni and Oi are of the form
Ai→ while the only edges out are of the form→ C where C is a child of A in
G. We then apply the extended ID algorithm described above to first determine
whether p(V (n1, o1, . . . , nk, ok)) would be identified given a positive distribu-
tion p(V ∪{N1, O1, . . . , Nk, Ok}) over the observed variables and the treatment
components.38
In the second step, we check whether the identification would hold under the
weaker conditions where we only have access to a positive distribution on p(V ).
This corresponds to confirming that for every (Ni, Oi) in the identifying for-
mula given by the ID Algorithm,39 there is no district D which has both Ni and
Oi as parents; [17] terms such districts, which violate this condition, recanting
districts.40
37That is, we have identification if, for each i and each child C ofAi in G, the subset of the pi components
of Ai that are parents of C in the expanded graph Gex take the same value.
38This would correspond to an observational study where the variables V ∪ {N1, O1, . . . , Nk, Ok} are
observed in a population in which Ni and Oi are no longer deterministic functions of Ai, but for which all
other one-step ahead counterfactuals remain the same; variables inH are not observed.
39See (20) in [20]
40Note that in the special case where D = {Vi} is a singleton, then D will be a recanting district in G if
and only if Ni and Oi have a common child in G
ex. In this case Vi is a ‘recanting witness’ as defined in
[2]; see also §4, p.34. Thus, when no hidden variables exist, the first step in (b) always succeeds; hence, as
implied Lemma 1, identification fails if and only if there exists anNi and Oi that have a common child.
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A N n
O o
M(n)
Y (n, o)
Figure 8: A SWIG derived from the expanded DAG Gex in Figure 3 (c), under the
assumption that the counterfactual variables obey the NPSEM associated with Gex.
Consequently, in contrast to Figure 4(b), the graph containsM(n) rather thanM(n, o).
A simple example of such a structure arises when there is an unobserved com-
mon cause of M and Y , as shown in Figure 5(b): though the four distribu-
tionsE[Y (n, o)] are identified given a four arm (N,O) trial, the distributions for
which n 6= o are not identified solely given data on (A,M, Y ). This is because
M ← H → Y forms a district and both N and O are parents of this district,
hence it is recanting.
If the two step procedure yields identification, the resulting functional struc-
turally resembles the functional obtained from the ID algorithm, except each
term in the functional that depends on treatments is evaluated at its own treat-
ment value, corresponding to either ni or oi (but never both at once).
See Section 4 below for a general method of addressing all complications above simul-
taneously.
3.6 Identification Of Cross-World Nested Counterfactuals Of DAG
G Under An FFRCISTG Model For Its Expanded Graph Gex
From §3.2 to this point, we only studied the distribution of counterfactuals associated
with interventions on (Ni, Oi) or, more generally, (A
(1), . . . , A(p)); no other counter-
factuals associated with an expanded graph Gex were mentioned. As argued in §3.2,
for most purposes these counterfactuals constitute an adequate basis for formulating
contrasts relating to the mediation of effects. However, since the prior literature on me-
diation has been formulated in terms of cross-world nested counterfactuals associated
with the original (unexpanded) DAG G, we return to our earlier discussion.
The Pure Direct Effect (PDE)
Recall that in §1 we related the PDE from the NPSEM associated with Figure 3(a)
to a four arm (N,O) trial under the FFRCISTG associated with the SWIG Gex(n, o)
shown in Figure 4(b). This may be broken down into two steps:
(1) Show that E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] was identified from data on p(A,M, Y ) via
(12). This step only required that Gex was a population FFRCISTG.41 That is,
41Thus this step does not require that the counterfactual variables follow an NPSEM associated with Gex.
26
this identification follows from the deterministic relationshipN(a) = O(a) = a
together with the population level conditions (15) and (14), without requiring an
M counterfactual be well-defined.
(2) Next show that Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) = Y (n = 0, o = 1) holds under the
individual level no direct effect assumptions encoded in the NPSEM associated
with Gex in Figure 8. Note that this step does not require that Figure 3(c) is an
FFRCISTG, only that it be an NPSEM associated with Gex.
In more detail, the NPSEM associated with Gex implies the following:
(i) M(n) = M(a, n, o);
(ii) Y (o,m) = Y (a, n, o,m).
Under conditions (i) and (ii) we have that:
M(a = 0) = M(N(a = 0)) = M(n = 0)
Y (a = 1,m) = Y (O(a = 1),m) = Y (o = 1,m)
Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) = Y (o = 1,M(n = 0)) = Y (n = 0, o = 1).
(19)
Consequently, under the assumptions (i), (ii) it follows that:
P (Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))) = P (Y (n = 0, o = 1)). (20)
Remarks:
1. If N(a) = O(a) = a and conditions (i) and (ii) hold, then PDE = E[Y (n =
0, o = 1)] − E[Y (n = 0, o = 0)] even if conditions (15) and (14) fail, for
example due to (M,Y ) confounding. This is the situation discussed in §1 where
data from the four arm (N,O) trial makes it possible to estimate the PDE and
hence determine whether it equals the mediation formula.
2. The conditions (15) and (14) alone, i.e. without (2) above, are not sufficient
to identify the PDE,42 though, as noted, they do identify E[Y (n = 0, o =
1)]− E[Y (n = 0, o = 0)].
3.(i) If condition (i) fails, so that O has a (population) direct effect on M (relative
to A, N ) then the counterfactual M(n, o) is not a function of the original one
step ahead counterfactuals Y (a,m) and M(a). This can be seen from the fact
that whereasM has a single parent A in Figure 3 (a), under the elaboration that
includesN and O it now has two: {N,O}.
42 This is because
E[Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))] = E[Y (n = 1, o = 1,M(n = 0, o = 0))] (21)
=
∑
m
E[Y (n = 1, o = 1, m) |M(n = 0, o = 0) = m]p(M(n = 0, o = 0) = m),
(22)
but this latter conditional expectation term is cross-world in terms of the counterfactuals in Gex and hence
not identified under the (population) FFRCISTG associated with the graph in Figure 4(b) even given data
from the four arm (N,O) trial.
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3.(ii) Similarly, if condition (ii) fails, so that N has a direct effect on Y (relative to
A, M , O) then the counterfactual Y (n, o) is not a function of the original one
step ahead counterfactuals. Y has two parent {A,M} in Figure 3 (a), under the
elaboration that includesN and O it would have three {N,O,M}.
Example: The River Blindness Studies
Returning to the River Blindness study, note that intervening to set s = 1 and a = 0
gives Y (s = 1, a = 0) = Y (a = 1,M(a = 0)) as random variables. Hence the
PDE is identified from data in a four arm (A,S) trial.43 It is not identified from data
on A, M , Y because M ↔ Y forms a ‘recanting district,’ as defined in [17]. Note
that had the PDE been not identified due to a recanting witness, i.e. A and S having
a common child, then additional interventions on the variables in the graph would not
have led to identification. Finally we note that, owing to the context specific conditional
independences in this example, the distribution p(Y (n = 1, o = 0)), which occurs in
the Total Direct Effect is identified given data from the two arms p(Y (n= x, s= x)),
x ∈ {0, 1} and hence also from p(A,M, Y ); see Appendix §6.2.
Counterfactuals related to the DAG in Figure 5(a)
Recall that E[Y (n = 0, o = 1)] is identified under the FFRCISTG models associated
with the graphs in Figure 6(a) and (b), but not (c).
Let Y (a, l,m), M(a, l) and L(a) denote the one-step-ahead counterfactuals asso-
ciated with the graph in Figure 5(a). It follows from the deterministic counterfactual
relationN (a) = O (a) = a and the NPSEM associated with Fig. 5 (a), and its associ-
ated expanded graph Gex in Figure 6 (a) that the random variable
Y (n=0, o=1) = Y (o = 1, L(n = 0),M(n = 0, L(n = 0)))
associated with the NPSEM in Figure 6(a) can be written in terms of the counterfactuals
associated with the graph in Figure 5(a) as the cross-world counterfactual
Y (a=1, L(a=0),M(a=0)) = Y (a=1, L(a=0),M(a=0, L(a=0))). (23)
Similarly, if we assume that Gedge of Figure 9 is an NPSEM, the counterfactual (23)
also equals, as a random variable, the counterfactualY (A(1) = 0, A(2) = 0, A(3) = 1).
Thus if either Figure 6(a) or Figure 9 represented the FFRCISTG generating the data,
the distribution of (23) is identified by the same formula (17).
Likewise,
Y (n=0, o=1) = Y (o = 1, L(o = 1),M(n = 0, L(o = 1)))
associated with the graph in Figure 6(b) equals (as a random variable) the cross-world
counterfactual
Y (a = 1, L(a = 1),M(a = 0, L(a = 1))) (24)
43Recall that in Y (s = 1, a = 0), A is serving as ‘N ’; see Figure 3(e) and Footnote 23.
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associated with the graph in Figure 5(a). Again, if we assume that Gedge of Figure 9
is an NPSEM, the counterfactual (24) also equals Y (A(1) = 1, A(2) = 0, A(3) = 1)
(as a random variable). Thus in this case if either Figure 6(b) or Figure 9 represented
the FFRCISTG generating the data, the distribution of (24) is identified by the same
formula (18).
In contrast E[Y (n= 0, o= 1)] associated with the graph in Figure 6(c) is not the
mean of any counterfactual defined from Y (a, l,m),M(a, l), andL(a) under the graph
in Figure 5(a) since L, after intervening to set n = 0, o = 1, is neither L(a = 1) nor
L(a = 0) as both imply a counterfactual for L under which n = o.
Furthermore, the parameter occurring in the PDE
E [Y (a = 1,M(a = 0))] = E [Y (a = 1, L(a = 1),M(a = 0, L(a = 0)))]
and associated with the graph in Figure 5(a) is not identified under the FFRCISTGs
associated with any of the three graphs in Figure 6(a), (b) and (c). This is because all
three of these graphs are compatible with the NPSEM in Figure 5(a) under which, by
recursive substitution, we have the following equality
Y (a1,M(a0)) = Y (a1, L(a1),M(a0, L(a0))),
as random variables. But the counterfactual Y (a1, L(a1),M(a0, L(a0))), since it in-
volves L(a0) and L(a1), does not correspond to an intervention on n and o under any
of the expanded graphs in Figure 6(a), (b) or (c). Similarly, Y (a0,M(a1)) is not iden-
tified under any of these graphs. These results follow from the fact that L is a recanting
witness for A in Figure 5(a).
In the following section, we define path specific effect associated with the NPSEM
model. We show that the two identified nested cross-world counterfactuals are identi-
fied path-specific effects under the NPSEM-IE for the graph in Figure 5(a). In particu-
lar, E[Y (a = 1, L(a = 0),M(a = 0))] is the path-specific effect associated with the
path A → Y and E[Y (a = 1, L(a = 1),M(a = 0, L(a = 1)))] is the path-specific
effect associated with the paths A → Y , A → L → Y , and A → L → M → Y .
Thus, for Pearl, identification of these nested cross-world counterfactuals associated
with Figure 5(a) follows from the assumption that the distribution of the counterfactu-
als obeys the NPSEM-IE model associated with the graph in Figure 5(a). In contrast,
the identification of these cross-world counterfactuals under an FFRCISTG model fol-
lows from two different extensions of Pearl’s original story: the first is identified under
the extension in which N but not O is a cause of L and the second from the extension
that O but notN is a cause of L.
4 Path-Specific Counterfactuals
In §1 we considered different notions of direct effect, which led to the notion of nested
counterfactuals and the Pure Direct Effect, which is identified under the NPSEM-IE
associated with the graph in Figure 3(a) via the associated Mediation Formula. In
§3.2, following [15], we discuss the notion of separability of effects in the sense of
[25] via an expanded (N,O) graph. We showed that the counterfactuals defining the
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Figure 9: The edge expanded graph Gedge associated with the DAG shown in Figure 5
(a).
PDE were equal to ordinary (non cross-world) interventional counterfactuals in the
NPSEM given by the expanded graph (with determinism). We also showed that under
the corresponding FFRCISTG these effects were identified by the mediation formula.
In this section we now consider path specific effects which generalize the notion of
direct and indirect effects.
In the simplest setting, the intuition behind an indirect effect is to consider all paths
from A to Y other than the edge A → Y . This can be generalized to settings where
the effect along a particular set of causal paths from A to Y is of interest. In what fol-
lows we will show that each such path specific effect will correspond to a cross-world
counterfactual contrast associated with the (original) graph G. We will see that in the
absence of recanting witnesses, these cross-world counterfactuals are equal (as random
variables) to interventional counterfactuals in the NPSEM associated with Gedge, the
edge expanded graph associated with the set of treatment variablesA.44 Consequently,
these path specific counterfactuals will be identified if and only if the corresponding
intervention is identified under the FFRCISTG associated with Gedge. Thus all identi-
fying formulae for path-specific cross-world counterfactuals on G may be derived from
Gedge. Further, it follows that all identifying formulae for path specific cross-world
counterfactuals may also be obtained under the assumption that G is an NPSEM-IE.
The general theory developed by [17] associates a random variable with each subset
of causal paths between a treatment A and an outcome Y . The intuition is that this
subset of proper45 causal paths from A to Y denoted π remain active, while all other
causal paths, denoted π, from A and Y are blocked.46 Next, pick a pair of value sets a
and a′ for elements in A; a will be associated with active paths, a′ with those that are
44As noted earlier, the counterfactuals associated with Gedge may not have clear substantive meaning. For
Gedge to be substantive it is necessary for each treatment variable A to be decomposable into components
each of which could, in principle, be intervened on (separately) and affect one and only one of its children;
see footnote 34, §3.4 for further discussion. The graph Gedge may still be useful as a formal construction;
see p. 32 below.
45A proper causal path intersects the set A only once at the source node.
46It is important to understand that the predicates ‘active’ and ‘blocked’ are applied to paths. In particular,
it is possible for every edge and vertex on a blocked path to also be present on some active path, and vice-
versa.
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blocked.
For any Vi ∈ V , define the potential outcome Vi(π, a, a
′) by setting A to a for the
purposes of paths in π that end in Vi, and setting A to a
′ for the purposes of proper
causal paths from A to Vi not in π.
47 Formally, the definition is as follows, for any
Vi ∈ V :
Vi(π, a, a
′) ≡ a if Vi ∈ A, (25)
Vi(π, a, a
′) ≡ Vi({Vj(π, a, a
′) | Vj ∈ pa
pi
i }, {Vj(a
′) | Vj ∈ pa
pi
i })
where Vj(a
′) ≡ a′ if Vj ∈ A, and given by recursive substitution otherwise, pa
pi
i is the
set of parents of Vi along an edge which is a part of a path in π, and pa
pi
i is the set of
all other parents of Vi.
A counterfactual Vi(π, a, a
′) is said to be edge inconsistent if for some edge Ak →
Vj in G, counterfactuals of the form Vj(ak, . . .) and Vj(a
′
k, . . .) occur in Vi(π, a, a
′),
otherwise it is said to be edge consistent. In the former case Vj is said to be a recanting
witness (for π). It is simple to verify using (25) that edge consistent counterfactuals
are precisely those where no paths in π and π¯ share the initial edge. [17, 22] have
shown that a joint distribution p(V (π, a, a′)) containing an edge-inconsistent counter-
factual Vi(π, a, a
′) is not identified in the NPSEM-IE (nor weaker causal models) in
the presence of a recanting witness.
As an example, consider the graph shown in Figure 5(a) and the counterfactual
given in (23) which corresponds to the path π1 = {A→ Y }:
Y (π1, a=1, a=0) ≡ Y (a = 1, L(a = 0),M(a = 0, L(a = 0))).
The counterfactual associated with the paths π2 = {A → Y,A → L → Y } is given
by:
Y (π2, a=1, a=0) ≡ Y (a = 1, L(a = 1),M(a = 0, L(a = 0))).
Note that Y (π1, a=1, a=0) is edge consistent, while Y (π2, 1, 0) is edge-inconsistent
due to the presence of L(a = 0) and L(a = 1). 48
This result is proved in [22]:
Theorem 1 If V (π, a, a′) is edge consistent, then under the NPSEM-IE for the DAG
G,
p(V (π, a, a′)) =
K∏
i=1
p(Vi | a ∩ pa
pi
i , a
′ ∩ papii , pa
G
i \A). (26)
As an example of such an identification consider the distribution p(Y (π, a, a′)) of the
edge consistent counterfactual in Figure 5(a). It follows from Theorem 1 that
p(Y (π1, a=1, a=0)) = p(Y (a = 1, L(a = 0),M(a = 0, L(a = 0))))
=
∑
m,l
p(Y |m, l, a = 1)p(m | l, a = 0)p(l | a = 0)
47Note that it follows from the definition of proper causal path that each path in pi is associated with a
unique vertex in A; similarly for each path in pi. (Two paths may be associated with the same vertex in A.)
48The above development may be generalized to k different assignments rather than two, by partitioning
the set of paths into k. These and other generalizations are termed path interventions by [22].
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Figure 10: An edge expanded graph that considers components of the treatment vari-
ables A1 and A2.
a marginal distribution derived from (26).
In the following, we exploit an equivalence between edge consistent counterfactuals
Vi(π, a, a
′) and standard potential outcomes based on edge expanded graphs Gedge,
already defined in the case of a single treatment variable in §3.3.49 In this section, we
will abbreviate Gedge as Ge for conciseness. The edge expanded graph both simplifies
complex nested potential outcome expressions and enables us to leverage the prior
result in [18] to identify conditional Path Specific Effects.
We now extend the definition of expanded graph to sets of treatments |A| > 1:
Given an ADMG G(V ), define for each Ai ∈ A ⊆ V a new set of variables, A
Ch
i ≡
{Aji | Vj ∈ Chi} such that XAj
i
≡ XAi ; thus for each directed edge Ai → Vj in G(V )
from a treatment variable to its child, we have created a new variableAji with the same
state space as Ai. Denote the full set of new variables as A
Ch ≡
⋃
Ai∈A
AChi . We
define the edge expanded graph of G(V ), written Ge(V ∪ ACh), as the graph with the
vertex set V ∪ACh; the edge expanded graph contains all the edges in G except for the
edges Ai → Vj that join a treatment variable Ai to its child Vj , in addition we add the
edges Ai → A
j
i → Vj (which thus ‘replace’ the removed edge Ai → Vj).
As an example, the edge expanded graph for the DAG in Figure 3 (a), withA1 = V ,
is shown in Figure 10. For conciseness, we will generally drop explicit references to
vertices V ∪ ACh, and denote edge expanded graph of G(V ) by Ge.
More generally, we associate a causal model with Ge as follows. Recall that we
associated a set of one-step ahead potential outcomes V with the original graph G.
Similarly, we let Ve denote the set of one-step ahead potential outcomes associated
with Ge, constructed as follows: For every Vi(pai) ∈ V, we let Vi(pa
e
i ) be in V
e. Note
that this is well-defined, since Vi in G and G
e share the number of parents, and the
parent sets for every Vi share state spaces. In addition, for every A
j
i ∈ A
Ch, we let
Aji (ai) for ai ∈ XAi be in V
e.
The edges Ai → A
j
i in G
e are understood to represent deterministic equality re-
lationships, such that Aji = Ai. More precisely, every A
j
i ∈ A
Ch has a single parent
49A similar construction was called the ‘extended graph’ in [5].
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Ai, and we let A
j
i (ai) = ai so that A
j
i (ai) is a degenerate (constant) random vari-
able corresponding to a point-mass at ai. The FFRCISTG model associated with the
edge expanded graph Ge includes these deterministic relationships. Note that it follows
that given a distribution p(V) over the counterfactuals given by the NPSEM G there is
a unique distribution pe(Ve) over the counterfactuals given by Ge that satisfies these
deterministic relationships.
We now show the following two results. First, we show that an edge-consistent
V (π, a, a′) may be represented without loss of generality by a counterfactual response
to an intervention on a subset of ACh in Ge with the causal model defined above.
Second, we show that this response is identified by the same functional (26).
Given an edge consistent V (π, a, a′), define Ge for A ⊆ V . We define api that
assigns ai to A
j
i ∈ A
Ch if Ai → Vj in G(V ) is in π, and assigns a
′
i to A
j
i ∈ A
Ch
if Ai → Vj in G(V ) is not in π. The resulting set of counterfactuals V (a
pi) is well
defined in the model for Ve, and we have the following result, proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Fix a distribution p(V) in the causal model for a DAG G(V ), and con-
sider the corresponding distribution pe(Ve) in the FFRCISTG model associated with
a DAG Ge(V ∪ ACh). Then for every Vi ∈ V , the random variable Vi in the original
model associated with G is equal to the random variable Vi in the sub-model associated
with Ge. Moreover, for any edge consistent π, a, a′, the random variable Vi(π, a, a
′)
in the original model associated with G is equal to the random variable Vi(a
pi) in the
restricted model associated with Ge.
Theorem 2 Under the FFRCISTG model associated with the edge expanded DAG Ge,
for any edge consistent π, a, a′:
pe(V (api)) =
K∏
i=1
pe(Vi | a
pi ∩ paG
e
i , pa
Ge
i \A). (27)
Note that since, by definition, the distribution pe(V ∪ACh) is a deterministic function of
p(V ), hence by (27) pe(V (api)) is identified by p(V ). Recall that if Ge is an FFRCISTG
model then this requires that all of the interventions on the variables in ACh are well-
defined.
Corollary 2 Under the NPSEM-IE model associated with the DAG G, for any edge
consistent π, a, a′:
p(V (π, a, a′)) = pe(V (api)) =
K∏
i=1
pe(Vi | a
pi ∩ paG
e
i , pa
Ge
i \A),
where Ge is the edge expanded graph corresponding to G.
In fact, Corollary 2 provides an alternative proof of Theorem 1 since, by definition, for
any edge consistent π, a, a′:
p(Vi | a ∩ pa
pi
i , a
′ ∩ papii , pa
G
i \A) = p
e(Vi | a
pi ∩ paG
e
i , pa
Ge
i \A).
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Though, as discussed previously, if the graph G is an NPSEM-IE the graph Ge may be
regarded as a purely formal construction that aids in the derivation of the identifying
formulae. However, if Ge is interpreted as a causal model, so that there are well-defined
counterfactuals associated with intervening on each of the vertices in ACh, then Ge
provides an interventionist interpretation of path-specific counterfactuals; in fact these
interventions allow the identification results above to be checked, in principle, in a
hypothetical randomized trial.
In the causal models derived from DAGs with unobserved variables (e.g., G(V ∪
H)), identification of distributions on potential outcomes such as p(V (a)) or p(V (π, a, a′))
may be stated without loss of generality on the latent projection ADMG G(V ). A com-
plete algorithm for identification of path-specific effects in NPSEM-IEs with hidden
variable was given in [17] and presented in a more concise form in [21].
We now show that identification theory for p(V (π, a, a′)) in latent projection AD-
MGs G(V ) may be restated, without loss of generality, in terms of identification of
pe(V (api)) in Ge(V ∪ ACh).
Proposition 4 Let G(V ∪H) be a DAG. Under the FFRCISTG model associated with
the edge expanded DAG Ge(V ∪ACh∪H), for any edge consistent π, a, a′ and Y ⊆ V ,
it follows that Y (π, a, a′) = Y (api) and thus p(Y (π, a, a′)) is identified given p(V ) if
and only if pe(Y (api)) is identified from pe(V ∪ ACh).
This Proposition is a generalization of Theorem 2 from DAGs to latent projection AD-
MGs. To determinewhether pe(Y (api)) is identifiedwe examine the ADMG Ge(V,ACh).
Since this graph is a standard latent projection ADMG (albeit with deterministic rela-
tionships relating A and ACh), the extended ID algorithm decomposes the distribution
pe(Y (api)) into a set of factors as in (20). However, in order for pe(Y (api)) to be iden-
tified given data p(V ),50 an additional requirement must be placed on the terms of this
decomposition. Specifically, for each term pe(VD(a
pi, v
pas
Ge(Y (aπ))
D
) = vD) in (20),
it must be the case that api assigns consistent values to each element of A that is in
pas
Ge(Y (aπ))
D . This requirement corresponds to the recanting district criterion which
was introduced and shown to be complete in [17]. Aside from this requirement, each
termmust be identified by the extended ID algorithm described in the companion paper
[20].51
4.1 Conditional Path-Specific Distributions
Having established that we can identify path-specific effects by working with poten-
tial outcomes derived from the Ge model, we turn to the identification of conditional
path-specific effects using the po-calculus. In [18], the authors present the conditional
identification (IDC) algorithm for identifying quantities of the form p(Y (x)|W (x)) (in
our notation), given an ADMG. Since conditional path-specific effects correspond to
exactly such quantities defined on the model associated with the edge expanded graph
Ge, we can leverage their scheme for our purposes. The idea is to reduce the conditional
50Note that the vertex set for Ge(V,ACh) comprises V ∪ACh. Further, by construction, the distribution
over pe(V ∪ ACh) is degenerate since the variables in ACh are deterministic functions of those in A.
51See point (b) in §3.5.
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problem, identification of pe(Y (api)|W (api)), to an unconditional (joint) identification
problem for which a complete identification algorithm already exists.
The algorithm has three steps: first, exhaustively apply Rule 2 of the po-calculus to
reduce the conditioning set as much as possible; second, identify the relevant joint dis-
tribution using Proposition 4 and the complete algorithm in [21]; third, divide that joint
by the marginal distribution of the remaining conditioning set to yield the conditional
path-specific potential outcome distribution.
Note that we make use of SWIGs defined from edge expanded graphs of the form
Ge(api, z). Beginning with Ge the SWIG Ge(api, z) is constructed by the usual node-
splitting operation: split nodes Z and Aji into random and fixed halves, where A
j
i has
a fixed copy a if Ai → Vj in G(V ) is in π, and a
′
i if Ai → Vj in G(V ) is not in π.
Relabeling of random nodes proceeds as previously described. This procedure is in
fact complete, as shown by the following result with a proof found in [5].52
Theorem 3 Let p(Y (π, a, a′) |W (π, a, a′)) be a conditional path-specific distribution
in the causal model for G, and let pe(Y (api) |W (api)) be the corresponding distribution
under the FFRCISTG associated with the edge expanded graph Ge(V ∪ ACh). Let Z
be the maximal subset ofW such that pe(Y (api) |W (api)) = pe(Y (api, z) |W (api, z)\
Z(api, z)). Then pe(Y (api) |W (api)) is identifiable in Ge if and only if pe(Y (api, z),W (api, z)\
Z(api, z)) is identifiable in Ge.
As an example, p(Y (a,M(a′))) is identified from p(C,A,M, Y ) in the causal
model in Figure 11 (a), via
p(Y (a,M(a′))) =
∑
m
(∑
c p(Y,m | a, c)p(c)∑
c p(m | a, c)p(c)
)(∑
c∗
p(m | a′, c∗)p(c∗)
)
.
However p(Y (a,M(a′))|C) is not identified, since p(Y (a,M(a′)), C) must first be
identified, and this joint distribution is not identified via results in [17]. On the other
hand, p(Y (a,M(a′))|C) is identified from p(C,A,M, Y ) in a seemingly similar graph
in Figure 11 (b), via
∑
M p(Y |M,a,C)p(M | a
′, C).
5 Conclusion
We have shown here, that graphical insights, derived from Pearl’s thought experiment,
may be used to place mediation analysis on a firm interventionist footing, and yield
analyses of direct, indirect, and path-specific effects that are amenable to falsification,
and explainable to practitioners.
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Figure 11: (a) A hidden variable causal DAG where p(Y (a,M(a′))) is identified, but
p(Y (a,M(a′)) | C) is not identified. (b) A seemingly similar hidden variable causal
DAG where both p(Y (a,M(a′))) and p(Y (a,M(a′)) | C) are identified.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of PDE bounds under the FFRCISTG model
We here prove the bounds on the PDE implied by the FFRCISTG model associated
with the graph in Figure 3 (a).
Proof: It follows from the definition that: PDEa,a′ = P (Y (a,M(a
′)) = 1)−P (Y =
1 | A = a′). Note that
p(Y (a,M(a′))=1) = p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M = 0 | A = a′)
+p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M = 1 | A = a′)
= p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M = 0 | A = a′)
+p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M = 1 | A = a′).
The quantities p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 0) and p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 1)
are constrained by the law for the observed data via:
p(Y =1 |A=a,M=0) = p(Y (a,m = 0)=1)
= p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M(a′) = 0)
+p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M(a′) = 1)
= p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M = 0 | A = a′)
+p(Y (a,m = 0)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M = 1 | A = a′),
p(Y =1 |A=a,M=1) = p(Y (a,m = 1)=1)
= p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M(a′) = 0)
+p(Y (a = 1,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M(a′) = 1)
= p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 0)p(M = 0 | A = a′)
+p(Y (a,m = 1)=1 |M(a′) = 1)p(M = 1 | A = a′).
It then follows from the analysis in §2.2 in [11] that the set of possible values for
the pair
(α0, α1) ≡ (p(Y (a,m=0) = 1 |M(a
′) = 0), p(Y (a,m=1) = 1 |M(a′) = 1))
compatible with the observed joint distribution p(m, y | a) is given by:
(α0, α1) ∈ [l0, u0]× [l1, u1]
where,
l0 = max{0, 1 + (p(Y =1 | A = a,M = 0)− 1)/p(M = 0 | A = a
′)},
u0 = min{p(Y =1 | A = a,M = 0)/p(M = 0 | A = a
′), 1},
l1 = max{0, 1 + (p(Y =1 | A = a,M = 1)− 1)/p(M = 1 | A = a
′)},
u1 = min{p(Y =1 | A = a,M = 1)/p(M = 1 | A = a
′), 1}. 
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Figure 12: The DAG corresponding to the projection of the DAG G shown in Figure
1(a) after marginalizingR.
6.2 Proof that the PDE is not identified in the River Blindness
study
Consider the NPSEM-IE corresponding to the DAG shown in Figure 12, which may
be obtained by marginalizingR from the causal DAG representing the River Blindness
studies shown in Figure 1(a).
The one-step-ahead counterfactuals defining the model are: U , A, S(a), M(a, u),
Y (m, s, u). We will assume that all variables, including U , are binary. Though not
shown explicitly on the graph, we also have the following constraints: (i) Y (m, s0, u0) =
Y (m, s0, u1) ≡ Y (m, s0); (ii) Y (m0, s1, u0) = Y (m0, s1, u1) ≡ Y (m0, s1); (iii)
M(a1, u0) =M(a1, u1) ≡M(a1), and (iv) S(a) = a. These arise from, respectively,
(i) the fact that if immuno-suppressants are not available (s = 0), then the patient’s
outcome (Y ) is not influenced by their predisposition (U ) to use medicine; (ii) the
availability of immuno-suppressants, and hence the patient’s predisposition (U ) to use
them, is not relevant to patients who do not receive Ivermectin;53 (iii) the fact that in a
randomized trial (a = 1) the treatment the patient receives is not influenced by U ; (iv)
The fact that the clinic is available (s = 1) if and only if a patient is in the randomized
trial (a = 1). The NPSEM-IE is then defined by the following 10 parameters:
U : θU ≡ p(U = 1);
A : θA ≡ p(A = 1);
M(a, u) : θM (a0, u) ≡ p(M(a0, u) = 1), for u ∈ {0, 1},
θM (a1) ≡ p(M(a1) = 1);
Y (m, s, u) : θY (m1, s1, u) ≡ p(Y (m1, s1, u) = 1), for u ∈ {0, 1},
θY (m, s) ≡ p(Y (m, s) = 1), for (m, s) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}.
Let θ denote a vector containing all of these parameters. The corresponding observed
53This is an additional restriction not present in the original account, but introduced here solely to reduce
the number of parameters. This corresponds to removing the U → R edge in the SWIG G(a1,m0, s1)
wherem is set to 0; see Figure 2. (Since non-identifiability under a submodel implies non-identifiability in
the larger model, we can make this assumption without loss of generality.)
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distribution pθ(A,M, Y ) is given by the follow equations:
pθ(A = 1) = θA,
pθ(M = 1 |A = a) =
{
θM (a0, u0)(1− θU ) + θM (a0, u1)θU , if a = 0,
θM (a1), if a = 1,
pθ(Y = 1 |A = a,M = m)
=
{
θY (m, sa), if (a,m) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)},
θY (m1, s1, u0)(1− θU ) + θY (m1, s1, u1)θU , if (a,m) = (1, 1).
Given θ, consider a perturbed vector θ˜ defined by taking
θ˜M (a0, u0) ≡ θM (a0, u0) + ǫ/(1− θU ),
θ˜M (a0, u1) ≡ θM (a0, u1)− ǫ/θU ,
for sufficiently small ǫ and leaving the other 8 parameters unchanged from θ. It is
simple to see that the resulting observed distribution is unchanged, so pθǫ(A,M, Y ) =
pθ(A,M, Y ), since the perturbation only changes the expression for p(M = 1 |A =
0), but the additional terms involving ǫ cancel.
Turning to the PDE we see that:
pθ(Y (a1,M(a0)) = 1)
= pθ(Y (M(a0), s1) = 1)
=
∑
u
pθ(Y (M(a0), s1) = 1 |U = u)pθ(U = u)
=
∑
u,k
pθ(Y (mk, s1) = 1 |U = u,M(a0) = k)pθ(M(a0) = k |U = u)pθ(U = u)
consistency =
∑
u,k
pθ(Y (mk, s1, u) = 1 |U = u,M(a0) = k)pθ(M(a0, u) = k |U = u)pθ(U = u)
independence =
∑
u,k
pθ(Y (mk, s1, u) = 1)pθ(M(a0, u) = k)pθ(U = u)
= θY (m0, s1)(1− θM (a0, u0))(1 − θU ) + θY (m0, s1)(1 − θM (a0, u1))θU
+ θY (m1, s1, u0)θM (a0, u0)(1 − θU ) + θY (m1, s1, u1)θM (a0, u1)θU .
A simple calculation shows that
pθ˜(Y (M(a0), s1) = 1) = pθ(Y (M(a0), s1) = 1)+ǫ (θY (m1, s1, u0)− θY (m1, s1, u1))
so that the PDE will take a different value under pθ˜, so long as θY (m1, s1, u0) 6=
θY (m1, s1, u1).
54
That the PDE is not identified in the River Blindness study example should not
be surprising in light of the results in §4. In particular, we know that Y (a1,M(a0)) =
54This inequality corresponds to the presence of the edge U → Y in Figure 12.
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A a=0
S(a0) s=1
M(a0)
U
R(a0, s1)
Y (a0, s1)
(a)
A a=1
S(a1) s=0
M(a1)
U
R(a1, s0)
Y (a1, s0)
(b)
Figure 13: (a) The SWIG G(a = 0, s = 1) associated with the DAG shown in Figure
1(a); (b) The SWIG G(a = 1, s = 0) associated with the DAG shown in Figure 1(a).
The U → M edge is absent because this is a randomized study (a = 1). The U → R
edge is not present because the clinic is not available (s = 0), hence patients do not
have the option to take immuno suppressants.
Y (s1, a0).
55 In addition, we see that in the SWIG G(a = 0, s = 1) shown in Figure
13(a), which here plays the role of the SWIG for the expanded graph Gex, Y (a0, s1)
is in the same district as M(a0), but the fixed nodes a = 0 and s = 1 are both par-
ents of this district, but are both associated with A in the original graph. Consequently
M(a0) ↔ Y (a0, s1) forms a recanting district. However, formally §4 considers mod-
els defined solely via ordinary conditional independences, whereas the model in the
River Blindness study also incorporated context specific independences. For this rea-
son, since a quantity may be unidentified in a model, but identified in a submodel, we
provided an explicit construction of an NPSEM-IE for the DAG in Figure 1(a).56
Similarly, consideration of the SWIG G(a=1, s=0) shown in Figure 13(b), shows
that p(Y (a1, s0)) is identified from p(A,M, Y ) because there is no recanting district:
57
p(Y (a1, s0) = 1) =
∑
r,m
p(y = 1 | r,m)p(r | s = 0,m)p(m | a = 1) g-formula
independence =
∑
r,m
p(y = 1 | r,m, s = 0)p(r | s = 0,m)p(m | a = 1)
marginalization =
∑
m
p(y = 1 |m, s = 0)p(m | a = 1)
determinism =
∑
m
p(y = 1 |m, a = 0)p(m | a = 1)
Thus, in this example, p(Y (a, s)) = p(Y (s,M(a))) is identified for (a, s) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0)},
but is not identified for (a, s) = (0, 1). Since Y (a0,M(a1)) = Y (a1, s0), it follows
55This assumes that missing edges correspond to the absence of direct effects at the individual level, so
thatM(a0, s1) = M(a0).
56Since the NPSEM-IE is a submodel of the FFRCISTG, this also establishes that the PDE is not iden-
tified under the latter interpretation of the DAG in Figure 1(a).
57Note that this identification argument does not use the additional constraint (ii).
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that p(Y (a0,M(a1))), which forms part of the Total Direct Effect (3), is also identified.
This conclusion also follows from Proposition 1, since equality (15) holds with
x = 1 (though not with x = 0).
6.3 Detecting Confounding via Interventions on A and S
In the River Blindness Study, it is not possible to detect the confounderU via interven-
tions on A and M , since the distribution {A,M(a), Y (a,m)} obeys the FFRCISTG
model corresponding to Figure 3(a). This is due to the context-specific independences
that hold in this example; see §2.5. However, confounding becomes detectable if we
are able to intervene on S and A. To see this note that:
p(Y (a0, s1) = 1 |M(a0) = 1] =
∑
u
p(Y (a0, s1) = 1 |M(a0) = 1, U = u)p(u |M(a0) = 1)
=
∑
u
p(Y (m1, s1, u) = 1 |M(a0) = 1, U = u)p(u |M(a0) = 1)
=
∑
u
p(Y (m1, s1, u) = 1)p(u |M(a0) = 1)
=
θY (m1, s1, u0)(1 − θU )θM (a0, u0) + θY (m1, s1, u1)θUθM (a0, u1)
(1 − θU )θM (a0, u0) + θUθM (a0, u1)
whichwill depend on θM (a0, u0) and θM (a0, u1), (if θY (m1, s1, u0) 6= θY (m1, s1, u1)).
However,
p(Y (a1, s1) |M(a1) = 1) =
∑
u
p(Y (a1, s1) |M(a1) = 1, U = u)p(u |M(a1) = 1)
=
∑
u
p(Y (m1, s1, u) |M(a1) = 1, U = u)p(u |M(a0) = 1)
=
∑
u
p(Y (m1, s1, u))p(u |M(a1) = 1)
=
∑
u
p(Y (m1, s1, u))p(u)
= θY (m1, s1, u0)(1 − θU ) + θY (m1, s1, u1)θU .
Thus p(Y (a0, s1) = 1 |M(a0) = 1) 6= p(Y (a1, s1) = 1 |M(a1) = 1), while if U
were absent we would have equality. 58 That the equality holds if U is absent may
be seen by removing U from the SWIG G(a, s) constructed from G in Figure 1(a) and
then applying Rule 3 of the po-calculus [20]: the equality follows from the fact that
a is d-separated from Y (a, s) given M(a). Conversely, that the equality fails to hold
when U is present is not surprising since we have the d-connecting path a→M(a)←
U → R(m, s)→ Y (m, s) in Figure 13(a).
58Note that under the additional assumption (iii), we have: p(Y (a0, s1) = 1 |M(a0) = 0] =
p(Y (a1, s1) = 1 |M(a1) = 0] since θY (m0, s1, u0) = θY (m0, s1, u1). Without (iii) the equality
will not hold.
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: For any Vi ∈ V , Vi(a
pi) is defined via (1) applied to Gedge,
Vi(a
pi) ≡ Vi
(
api
paG
edge
i
∩ACh
, V
paG
edge
i
\ACh
(api)
)
.
Similarly, Vi(π, a, a
′) is defined via (25) applied to G as
Vi(π, a, a
′) ≡ a if Vi ∈ A,
Vi(π, a, a
′) ≡ Vi({Vj(π, a, a
′) | Vj ∈ pa
pi
i }, {Vj(a
′) | Vj ∈ pa
pi
i })
where Vj(a
′) ≡ a′ if Vj ∈ A, and given by (1) otherwise, pa
pi
i is the set of parents of
Vi along an edge which is a part of a path in π, and pa
pi
i is the set of all other parents
of Vi.
By definition of Gedge, the induction on the tree structure of (25) in G matches the
induction on the tree structure of (1) in Gedge.
Finally, since Vi(π, a, a
′) is edge consistent, any edge of the form Ak → Vj in G,
for any Ak ∈ A that starts a proper causal path that ends at Vi is assigned precisely
one value (either aAk or a
′
Ak
). Moreover, this value in the base case of the induction
of (25), by definition of api matches the value apiAk assigned by the corresponding base
case of the induction of (1). This establishes our conclusion.
That the corresponding observed data variables Vi match in models represented
by the original graph G, and the edge expanded graph Gedge follows by the above
argument, using the fact that all elements in ACh are deterministically related to the
appropriate elements in A.

[5] prove a weaker result establishing equality in distribution.
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